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This thesis will be studying the EUs Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the 
notion of strategic autonomy, asking why at this particular time does the EU strive for 
strategic autonomy. This research puzzle together with the research question What factors are 
behind the EUs sudden strive for strategic autonomy and how can it best be theoretically 
explained? provides the focus of this thesis. We will be using a qualitative content analysis as 
a method to bring clarity to the puzzle and answer the question.   
The thesis will be arguing that while the traditional mainstream theories of liberalism, realism 
and constructivism has partial answers to the question, we will be arguing that the best 
theoretical understanding of why strategic autonomy has become such an important concept is 
neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is a much more comprehensive analytical tool for 
analysing international politics than liberalism and realism since it combines the international 
system level with the domestic level institutions, this makes it the preferred theory to answer 
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Aim and purpose  
In recent year European leaders have devoted a great deal of attention to the goal of 
achieving European strategic autonomy in the realm of security and defence. However 
traditional mainstream International Relations theories are not able to adequately explain why 
this has taken place at this moment in time. This research puzzle provides the focus of this 
analysis of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the notion of 
strategic autonomy.   
The aim of this thesis is to theoretically explain with the help of a qualitative content analysis 
why European leaders have focused considerable time, energy, and resources on the quest for 
strategic autonomy. The theoretical ambition is to utilize neoclassical realism as a tool of 
multilevel analyse examining how both system and domestic-level interaction influence 
leaders in their foreign policy behaviour.  
The European Union (EU) has a long history of incremental steps towards the enhancement of 
its security and defence cooperation. In 1999 the EU launched the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). This was given further impetus in 2009 with the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty which created the possibility for member states to engage in the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in security and defence matters, however, this mechanism 
was not activated until 2017.  
What has changed for the EU to accelerated CSDP cooperation’s right now and not before? 
Mainstream International Relations theories do give us some clues as to why, liberalism argus 
that the domestic political level is the most relevant place to analyse, while realist would 
focus on the balance-of-power or balance-of-threat of the international system. Finally, 
constructivist focus on normative structures such as knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms, 
which according to constructivist constructs the states identities and interest. All these 
theories offer partial insights on how states behave, but what they miss is the complex 
interplay of the systemic level on the domestic level and how it leads to foreign policy 
decision. This is where neoclassical realism has its strengths, by combining the different 




helps us better understand theoretically why there is so much activity right now in CSDP and 
why the notion of strategic autonomy has become so important.  
This thesis will therefore argue that the theoretical approach of neoclassical realism is the best 
approach for explaining the EUs search for strategic autonomy. Neoclassical realism analysis 
all the different unit-levels. This thesis will describe how the pressures from the changing 
international system has affected the EU and the leaders of its most important member 
countries Germany and France. An important unit-level factor that influences the whole 
discourse on strategic autonomy is the strategic culture of Germany and France. Germany and 
France also represent two different views on strategic autonomy, France is a big supporter and 
Germany is cautiously optimistic.  
This thesis will be using a qualitative content analysis, by a thorough analysis of policy 
document, written statements from EU leaders and interviews with political leaders,   
The research puzzle that is the focus of this thesis is the EUs Common security and defence 
policy (CSDP) and more specific the notion of “strategic autonomy” in security and defence 
issues, and what can explain the sudden strive for strategic autonomy? Which leads to the 
research question: What factors are behind the EUs sudden strive for strategic autonomy and 
how can it best be theoretically explained? 
The thesis will proceed as follows. The first section will briefly describe the evolution of 
CSDP and give a definition of what strategic autonomy within security and defence means. 
The next section will give a presentation of the three mainstream international relations 
theories and there take on the EUs CSDP and strategic autonomy. Then follows a presentation 
of the selected method for the thesis, and the last section will be an analysis and motivation of 
why this thesis thinks that neoclassical realism is the best theoretical framework for 









Evolution of CSDP and the quest for strategic autonomy 
The history of a common security and defence policy (CSDP) in the EU is long, 
dating back to 1948 and the Treaty of Brussels with the defence clause that created Western 
European Union (EEAS, 2020). In the early 1950s there was an attempt to create a European 
defence Community (EDC), the plan was to create a European army with a single political 
and military European authority (CVCE, 2020). The proposal was rejected by the French 
national assembly and was never ratified.  
The first real important milestone for a common foreign and security policy was with the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which laid the foundation for the EU to build CSDP 
on. The next milestone was the St Malo declaration in 1998 between France and United 
Kingdom, which has been described as the start of the European defence project. The British 
and French declaration should be viewed as an acknowledgement that the EU failed in the 
Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. This was supposed to be the hour of Europe when Europe 
stood up and solved its own problems without outside help. Sadly, the EU was not up to the 
task when faced with escalating violence (Hyde-Price 2018: 396).  Lessons learned from that 
episode went straight into the St Melo declaration where it stated that “the union must have 
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force, the means to decide 
to use them, and a readiness to do so” (Chaillot papers 47, 2001:8). At the same time 
emphasising that NATO was the bedrock of European security. Two years later at the 
European council meeting in Nice, key CSDP institutions were formally established and by 
2003 the EU had undertaken mission and operations. As impressive as this seems it is 
important to remember the ambition that the ´headline goals` put forth, and that where agreed 
upon at the Helsinki Council meeting in December 1999, of having the capacity to deploy 
within 60 days and sustain up to a year 60,000 personal, those troops should also be military 
self-sustaining has not yet been meet (Fiott, 2020:6).   
In 2003 the EU released the European Security Strategy, which is a milestone since it is the 
first strategic document ever produced by the EU. ESS set forth the EUs security strategy by 
identifying key threats and global challenges that EU faces. Now almost twenty years later, 




Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the 
first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability 
unprecedented in European history (Council of the European Union, 2003).  
That optimism stands in sharp contrast to the EUGS that stated that the Union faces a region 
that is more unstable and more insecure.  
Since then, the security and defence cooperation has intensified especially after the signing of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. That is when the EU developed its common security and defence 
policy (CSDP), another watershed event was the presentation of the Global strategy for the 
European union’s foreign and security policy in 2016, which replaced the ESS from 2003.  
The EUGS defines the vital interests of the EU foreign and security policy, and focuses on the 
most important strategic priorities, which the EU foreign ministers boiled down to four 
pillars, these are security and defence, building state and societal resilience, taking an 
integrated approach to conflicts and crises, strengthening cooperative regional orders and a 
rules-based global governance (EEAS, 2017).  
The EUGS also included several important defence initiatives, here we will present the most 
significant ones; Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) allows member states on 
voluntary basis to cooperate in security and defence to jointly plan, develop and invest in 
shared capability projects, and enhance the operational readiness and contribution of their 
armed forces (EDA, 2020). Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which is an 
annual review that will help to promote capability development by addressing shortfalls, 
deepen defence cooperation and to ensure optimal use of defence spending plans (EDA, 
2020).  
The last one is Capability Development Plan (CDP), that looks at future security threats, 
identifies capability needs that supports decision-making at EU and national levels (EDA, 
2020). Together with these initiatives, the concept of strategic autonomy has started to gain 







Strategic Autonomy  
Strategic autonomy is a wide-ranging concept that includes economic, technology, 
trade and more, this thesis will focus on strategic autonomy in the realm of defence and 
security. Strategic autonomy is a vague term that can mean a lot of thing, the first CARD 
(2020) review stated that there is a “uneven understanding of the concept of strategic 
autonomy” within the EU (CARD, 2020).  
In European Union global strategy (2016) they write that:  
As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be 
ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external 
threats. An appropriate level of … strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s 
ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders. 
(EUGS, 2016:19).  
The Council of the European Union (2017) defines strategic autonomy as the “capacity to act 
autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible”. This rather 
vague term has led to discussions in policy circles and national capitals about exactly what the 
implications it has for the EU.  
The European Union Institute for Security Studies has come up with three different 
conceptual visions of strategic autonomy that helps to focus our thinking: autonomy as 
responsibility, those who advocated autonomy as responsibility sees that greater burden 
sharing inside NATO, and within EU frameworks to strengthen the transatlantic alliance. In 
2007 at the Munich Security Conference Robert Gates the U.S defence secretary told the 
Europeans to increase their defence spending (NY times, 2007). Increased burden sharing is a 
long-time American demand of its NATO allies, in 2006 the NATO defence ministers agreed 
to spend a minimum of 2 % of their GDP on defence, something that many of the European 
countries has never meet (NATO, 2020).    
Autonomy as hedging, in the case that the US would withdraw from Europe, hedging is a way 
to ensure that EU defence structures and policies are capable to function autonomously. 
Hedging is seen as a way for the EU to maintain a good relationship with the USA, while at 




And finally, autonomy as emancipation, which is the most radical of them all. Advocates of 
this view means that “the EU can either protect European territory and its global interests by 
relying on full spectrum capabilities that are produced and owned by European governments, 
or it cannot.” (Fiott, 2018:6). Autonomy as emancipation means freedom from the 
dependencies the EU has with the US and the ability to not become dependent on another 
country again.  
Going by the definition of strategic autonomy described by the Council and the EUGS above, 
it is reasonable to describe it that the EUs vision is somewhere between responsibility and 
hedging. They still want and need close cooperation with NATO and at the same time they 
are unsure about the American commitment to the defence of Europe. Scholars like Fiott 
(2018:7) also states that the most convincing characterisation of EU strategic autonomy is that 
it lies somewhere between responsibility and hedging. Therefore, the definition that this thesis 


















Literature review  
There are several different theories that could be applied to the puzzle of the EUs 
CSDP and the notion of strategic autonomy. Here we will give a short presentation of the 
three mainstream international relations theories, liberalism, constructivism, and neorealism.   
Liberalism 
 
Liberalism, which is mostly concerned with the domestic political level, an argument 
a liberal could make is that when the internal politics of the three biggest security and defence 
contributors are in line and the people of European Union want the EU to take a bigger 
responsibility in securing the EUs boarders and its interests internationally, the internal 
politics will make them act according to the domestic pressures. It is true that the EU stands 
for liberal values as the EUGS (2016) makes clear, the EU is grounded in core liberal beliefs 
such as respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms, free trade, and the 
rule of law. But this does not explain why the EUs quest for strategic autonomy is starting to 
gain momentum right now. When for example there have been popular support for an 
increased military cooperation for many years. There are different strands of liberalism that 
defy a common definition, but they share certain assumptions, principals and a set of 
economic, philosophical, and political ideas. Richter (2016:50) writes that a liberal country 
can give up some of its sovereign to coordinate their polices at the regional or international 
level, and that such a decision is based on rationality. Member states basically makes a pros 
and cons list of the things that can happen if they join CSDP, and then makes the choice that 
will deliver the most utility for them.  
Pohl (2013a:369) argues that it is not the material capabilities that defines CSDP but the ideas 
about the proper means and ends of foreign policy, and that the relevant arena for the struggle 
for power is the domestic stage not the international stage. The national governments are 
focused on what their domestic societies want. According to Pohl (2013b:319) foreign policy 
is conducted primarily with a focus on expected domestical pressures and that the sources of 
domestic expectations are determined by normative values and perceptions of national 
interests. The public support for a common security and defence policy for the EU has been in 
the 70 percentiles since the 1999 (European commission, 2019). If Pohl is correct when he 




in mind, why then has it taken such a long time to get CSDP to strive for strategic autonomy. 
When the public support has be so strong for such a long period of time. 
In a democracy there are always internal struggles between the rival parties some may want 
more EU institutional integration, some will want less, this is nothing new and has been a 
function since the dawn of democracy. Of course, it is correct that you must have domestic 
political will to implement CSDP and to achieve the goals set forth in it and to achieve 
strategic autonomy, but where does this impetus for the domestic will come from? This thesis 
argues that it is the changing international system that is pressuring the EU leaders to promote 
strategic autonomy.  
Constructivism  
 
 Constructivism is one of the newest theories in International Relations and it 
challenges both realism and liberalism on some of their core assumptions. Constructivism 
says that “the world is of our making” which challenges the realist view that you can´t change 
things (Flockhart, 2016:80). A key insight of constructivism was the inclusion of the social 
element of human activity and that it must be front and centre for understanding states 
behaviours. The focus on normative structures such as knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms, 
constructs according to constructivist, states identities and interests (Barnett, 2016:147). 
Adrian Hyde-Price (2004) writes about how different strategic cultures exists in the EU, for 
which the formative years was the second world war and the ensuing Cold war, different 
experiences of the war led to different strategic cultures in the EU. For instance, German 
strategic culture is special because as one of the most powerful countries in the EU it sees 
itself as a civilian power because of its history of defeat after the second world war, and the 
rejection of militarism. Therefore, they see CSDP as a vehicle for it to establish an alternative 
platform to NATO where it can negotiate and enforce principles of mandate, missions, and 
means that allow Germany to maintain its authenticity according to Berenskoetter & 
Giegerich (2010). Meyer (2011:677) writes that: 
Norms within the context of strategic culture can be conceptualized as beliefs 
about what is appropriate, legitimate, or just regarding the goals and modalities 




Anderson & Seitz (2006) argues that CSDP is a way to foster a common identity and to help 
nation-building in the EU to solidify a common European identity. We have had a Common 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) since 1998 (changed to Common Security and 
Defence Policy with the Lisbon Treaty), and still, we are searching for a common strategic 
culture. In 1999 in the Presidents conclusions, they stated that “the Union must have the 
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to 
use them, and a readiness to do so”, this has not really come to fruition. Since the first CSDP 
mission in 2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina there have been 35 mission altogether and most 
of them are civilian in nature. If the constructivist argument that CSDP is a way to foster a 
common identity and solidify a common European identity, we should already be seeing a 
larger capacity for autonomous action, since that has been a shared focus since the start.  
Constructivism is often called social constructivism alluding to the role of social processes of 
interaction helps us create shared knowledge of how the world works (Flockhart, 2016:84). 
Neorealist claim that the anarchic international system shapes how states behave, and the 
influential paper by Alexander Wendt (1993) said that “anarchy is what states makes of it”, it 
is the shared norms and ideas that thru socialisation shapes and dictates how leaders perceive 
threats. This shows the profound difference between constructivism and the mainstream 
international relations theories. It is hard for 27 nation states with different histories and 
different geographies to come to an agreement on security and defence, member states in the 
south worries more about influx of migration and the stability of MEAN region. Whereas the 
Nordic countries are more worried about Russian and Chines influence. The strategic 
compass that the EU is working on will define the EUs security and defence ambitions and try 
to build a common European strategic culture. If it is successful in creating a single European 
strategic culture and socialisation process manages to convince leaders into believing that 
strategic autonomy is the right thing for the EU to stive for, then one can argue for the merits 









Neorealism or structural realism on the other hand is a systemic theory which means 
that it is focused on the international system, it´s explanatory powers are focused on the 
systemic level rather than the individual actor level of liberalism (Hyde-price 2012:18). 
Neorealism is a deductive top-down theoretical framework that views the international system 
as anarchic, meaning that there is not one overarching power to control the other states in the 
system. In addition to the anarchic international system neorealist consider differentiation of 
units i.e., sovereign states, and distribution of capabilities as the most important aspects of the 
international system. Given that the EU is not a sovereign state and only has the powers that 
the sovereign states that make up the membership of the EU is willing to give it, it can be 
difficult for neorealist to explain the EUs strive for strategic autonomy.  
Neorealist think that the relative distribution of power is the key to understanding war and 
peace, alliance politics and the balance of power (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017:108). Posen 
(2006:153) argue that balance-of-power against the US is the best way to understand the EUs 
CSDP and strategic autonomy. The EU is still deeply dependent of the Americans and NATO 
for their defence and all EU member countries that are members of the alliance have 
increased their contribution to the alliance (NATO, 2020). Since NATO is such an important 
part of the EUs security policy and is likely to remain that way it is hard to explain EUs strive 
for strategic autonomy from a neorealist perspective. All but six EU countries are full 
members of NATO and the rest of the non-member countries are NATO partners cooperating 
in the partnership for peace framework. How can you balance against yourself as a member of 
the transatlantic alliance?   
The autonomous action and resources that the CSDP gives the EU is nowhere near to be a 
serious balance-of-power act against the USA. A slightly more nuanced version of balance-
of-power argues that the EU by enhancing its military capabilities is in a better position to 
influence the US. The “influence motive” as Art (2006:182) calls it, is in his mind a clear case 
of balancing, with the EU having more power and influence vis-à-vis the USA, and by 
deliberately pooling and integrating their resources they are creating a more powerful and 




been on a UN mandate, which means that the US as a member of the security council has 
approved of the missions, that makes the case of balancing against the US harder.  
But CSDP also gives the EU the means to act autonomously in cases where the US is not 
interested and to take a larger security burden in the EUs geopolitical neighbourhood, this 
gives the US more freedom to act in other theatres.     
The anarchic international system is a self-help system and that affects the way states interact. 
Posen (2006:153) writes that in a system like that states must look after themselves to survive, 
and to do that military power is of the essence either through internal means or through 
alliances.  
The structure of the system will also affect how states interact, Kenneth Waltz (1979:71) the 
founder of neorealism says that after the second world war the international system change 
from a multipolar system to a bipolar system with USA and the Soviet Union as the great 
power change the politics among European states in a qualitative way. After the cold war we 
arguably ended up in a unipolar system with USA as the most powerful actor in the system. 
This change would according to neorealism mean that there would occur a balancing-of-
power against USA, one can make the argument that China and Russia are trying to balance 
against USA with their “strategic partnership”. President Putin said recently that you can´t 
rule out a military alliance between Russia and China (Isachenkov, 2020, October 22). But 
one cannot make the argument that the EU is balancing against the USA because they are so 
closely aligned thru NATO.  
Neorealism is an excellent analytical tool when one analyses change across the system but as 
Waltz (1979:71) admits it cannot analyse what happens inside the states. Therefore, this 
theory fails to address the leader, state, and international level that this thesis seeks to 
examine to answer why at this moment in time the EU is pushing for more strategic 
autonomy.  
Since neoclassical realism is a multilevel framework it is important to mention that the 







Theory – Explaining neoclassical realism. 
 
That is where neoclassical realism tries to correct the balance between the systemic 
and the particular (Wohlforth, 2016), neoclassical realism began as an attempt to solve the 
puzzles that realism could not account for, to fill the gaps within structural realism if you will. 
Neoclassical realism includes factors like perceptions of state leaders and how they view the 
distribution of capabilities, state-society relationship, and state identity (Dunne & Schmidt, 
2017:109). Neoclassical realism incorporates key insight from the traditional mainstream 
theories, by doing that it deepens and broadens the analysis.  
A critique that neoclassical realism has against structural realism is that states don´t always 
change mechanically to the changing international environment as balance-of-power theories 
implies. There are four especially important factors that can obstruct in this: 
the ability of leaders to perceive systemic stimuli correctly, the lack of clarity in 
the international system, the problem of rationality, and the difficulty of 
mobilizing domestic resources” (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016:20).  
These factors lead to states making policy decisions that is not always tailored to the external 
environment like structural realism would imply. Leaders are human after all and as humans 
the way they process information is fraught with biases, especially when the information at 
hand is incomplete or contradictory. The same can be said about rationality, leaders do not 
always react rationally to systemic stimuli. And to make things worse, the international 
system does not always send clear messages about threats and opportunities (Ripsman et al 
2016:22-23).  
Neoclassical realism is a much more comprehensive analytical tool for analysing international 
politics than liberalism and realism, it combines the international system level with the 
domestic level institutions. It takes neorealism as it´s starting point, that states respond to the 
constraint and opportunities of the international system when conducting their foreign and 
security policies (Ripsman 2011) and expands on neorealism’s parsimonious assumptions and 
adds individual and domestic level factors. Neoclassical realism has four broad categories of 
intervening unit-level variables, leaders’ images is linked to the leaders set of core beliefs and 




defined here as rules and norms, worldviews, and shared expectations which through 
socialization and institutionalization becomes entrenched beliefs and constrain a states 
behaviour. State-Society relations is defined by Ripsman et al (2016:70-71) “as the character 
of interactions between the central institutions of the state and various economic and or 
societal groups”. (Ripsman et al 2016:61-67-71)   
There are three different variants of neoclassical realism that utilizes different variables, these 
are called Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 and focus on different aspects of the different unit-
levels. This thesis will be using a type 2 variant because it has a scope of months to years 
which is the timeframe of the analyse.  
Type 1 acknowledges the empirical observations that show that states sometimes respond 
inconsistently to systemic pressures, but that they tend to conform to the pressure over time 
(Ripsman et al 2016:26). This is exactly what has happened in the case of China, political 
leaders in the EU have been so focused on the economic relationship with China that it just 
ignored all the signals that pointed towards a future security problem was rising. An important 
intervening variable in neoclassical realism is the beliefs that individual domestic leaders 
matters because everybody has different cognitive biases and political ideologies that affect 
how they process information (Ripsman et al 2016:61), which leads to the fact that political 
leaders can take radically different decisions, based on their norms, beliefs, prior experiences, 
and values.     
Instead of balancing against China, what we see is what Schweller (2004:168) calls 
underbalancing, which means that a state does not balance in the proper way or in an 
inefficiently way against a competitor. Schweller (2004:169) list four variables that explain 
variations in state responses to threats: “elite consensus, government or regime vulnerability, 
social cohesion, and elite cohesion.” When you have a strong elite consensus and social 
cohesion it is much easier to form a strong foreign policy and balance against threats, and 
conversely a weak or fragmented elite consensus/ elite cohesion vis a vis social cohesion will 
result in a state that cannot respond appropriately to external threats.  
Type 1 variant maintains that the international system sends clear signals, but the messages 
get construed thru the imperfect perception of the leaders and the troubles of domestic 
politics. Either the leaders misunderstand the signals, or they are prevented to properly act by 




into consideration in its analysis, type 1 works on the short time scale of days to weeks. 
During a crisis when a quick decision is needed the leader has the greatest potential to 
influence the policy, after time the leader’s ability to control the policy diminishes as more 
actors becomes involved in decision making (Ripsman et al 2016:91).    
Type 2 variant of neoclassical realism has bigger aspirations than trying to explain 
anomalies in the behaviour of states, rather it assumes that it can help explain a broad range of 
foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustments. If the leaders are not presented with a 
crisis moment and the international environment does not present a clear and present danger, 
the choices states make under these conditions may have more to do with the worldview of 
the leader, the strategic cultures of the states they lead, the nature of the domestic political 
constraints (Ripsman et al 2016:29).  
Type 3 variant has a far longer timeframe in its analysis, in the short to medium term 
neoclassical realism is an approach to study foreign policy and grand strategy. Over the 
medium to long term, it becomes an approach to study international politics. Since it takes a 
long time for the grand strategics of great powers to affect the other great powers in the 
system, it stands to reason that the systemic outcomes of their interaction take decades to 
reshape the international structures (Ripsman et al 2016:88).       
If type 1 worked on short time scope of weeks to months, type 2 extends the timeframe to the 
short-to-medium term which is defined in months and years but not decades because that is 
the purview of type 3 (Ripsman et al 2016:83).   
A systemic variable that distinguishes neoclassical realism from structural realism is clarity. 
Clarity from the signals and information that the international system presents the stats with. 
Ripsman et al (2016:47) argue that clarity is made of three components:  
the degree to which threat and opportunities are readily discernible, whether the 
system provides information on the time horizon of threats and opportunities and 
whether optimal policy options stands out or not. 
A key unit-level variable in neoclassical realism is the strategic culture of states, in this 
thesis we will focus on the strategic culture of Germany and France. Because of 
historical reason their strategic culture is quite different from each other. German 




size, their Nazi past, and the atrocities that they committed during the second world war 
still has a large effect on how the leaders view German military power. Germany 
defines itself as a civilian power promoting multilateralism, institutions-building, and 
through national and international norms it tries lower the use of force in international 
relations (Maull 2000). Their strategic culture makes it easier to pledge support to an 
EU initiative than investing it directly into its own warfighting capabilities even though 
German military expenditure has been going up in recent years, as SIPRI shows 
between 2018-2019 their military expenditures rose by 10% to reach 50$ billion. 
France with its long history of carry out foreign policy decisions with military means, has a 
strategic culture that is profoundly different from the German one. As an old colonial power 
France has had it military abroad for centuries to protect French civilians in its colonies and to 
protect its interests. According to Hellman (2016:24) a fundamental part of French doctrine is 
to remain a strong military power and to guard their great power status. France obsession with 
remaining a great power has led them to criticize the unipolar world that emerge after the cold 

















Method and material  
This thesis will be applying a qualitative content analysis, which is a method of analysing 
written, verbal, or visual communication in this case it will be an analysis of EU policy 
documents, statements made by influential EU leaders and defence white papers from 
Germany and France. The policy documents are selected because the represent the will of the 
governments of Germany and France and EU global strategy is an especially important policy 
paper that sets out the EUs core interests and principals, this makes it an important document 
to analyse.   
Qualitative content analysis is an excellent method for analysing texts and interpreting it´s 
meaning (Elo, Kääriäinen & Kanste, 2014). Systematic investigations are a way to bring 
clarity and systematise meaning in texts, this is done by highlighting and by making essential 
aspects of the content understandable (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, Towns & Wängnerud 
2017:213). To help us answer our research question we will be using a couple of specified 
questions to the texts, it will guide our reading of the material and help us answer our research 
question of what factors are behind the sudden strive for strategic autonomy and how to best 
answer it theoretically. Esaiasson et al (2017:216) writes that a qualitative content analysis is 
more than a summery of the text, it is a story you tell with the help of your chosen text and 
analytical tools.   
The treats the faces the EU are many raging from organized crime, international terrorism, 
cyber-attacks to climate change, these are all addressed in the various documents that are the 
basis for this thesis and are serious problems that needs to be dealt with. But they are not 
reasons enough for the EU to strive for strategic autonomy, there are already international 
cooperation on most of the issues and there is no reason for the EU to have strategic 
autonomy to fight climate change or international terrorism.  
This thesis has chosen four different case studies for exemplifying how the changing 
international system creates pressure on the EU which in turn has led to the strive for strategic 
autonomy in security and defence. The cases are a belligerent Russia, shifting American 
priorities, brexit and the rise of China. All these cases create systemic pressures on the EU in 





Esaiasson et al (2017:216) writes that some general framing of questions to the text is 
important to help us navigate the different texted being analysed and help us to tell our story. 
The thesis will be using a couple of questions as a tool to parse out the most relevant aspects 
of the texts.  
• How are the different case studies represented? Are they a problem or opportunity? 
• What is the cause of the problems? What are the opportunities?  























The EU is something of an enigma when it comes to international organizations, it is not a 
nation state and its more than an international organization, it is sui generis that is made up by 
27 different nation states. The different member states have different strategical goals and 
interests and operates in different geographies which leads to different geopolitical concerns 
and strategic cultures.  
 The four different case studies for showing how the changing international system creates 
pressure on the EU, a belligerent Russia, shifting American priorities, brexit and the rise of 
China.   
Russia 
The first source of concern is a revisionist Russia, it is Europe’s main security 
problem and has been causing trouble for the EU since at least 2008 when it went to war with 
Georgia (Posen 2020). The war was not the first time that Russia had caused concern in is 
region, but it was the thing that made the most impression on the leaders in the EU, it forced 
them to acknowledge Russian military expansion and modernization. In 2014 with the war in 
Ukraine and the later annexation of Crimea, there was no longer any doubt about Russian 
behaviour or intention, everybody was now aware that Russia was a revisionist power intent 
on gaining some of its former superpower status. The German white paper (2016) stated:  
Russia is openly calling the European peace order into question with its 
willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw 
borders guaranteed under international law, as it has done in Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine. (p.31) 
 
This is something that the EU global strategy also reiterated when discussing the European 
security order and the importance of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of 
states. It reads:  
peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. Russia’s violation of 




in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its 
core (EUGS, p.33) 
 
This shows how powerless the EU is against Russia even in its own regional neighbourhood, 
the EU has soft power but lacks the hard military power. If there were any doubt about 
Russian intentions before the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war with Ukraine, now 
those doubts are gone, and the clarity of the signal is received loud and clear. Russia has also 
been accused of using chemical weapons on European territory trying to kill dissidents. The 
first time it made the headlines was in 2006 with the polonium 210 poisoning of the Russian 
ex spy Alexander Litvinenko and again in 2018 in Salisbury, UK. This time it was with the 
extremely poisonous Novichok nerve agent, when two Russian FSB agent tried to kill another 
ex-Russian spy named Sergei Skripal.  
A stated above in the theory section neoclassical realism states that systemic clarity has an 
important function in the evaluation of threats and opportunities, when there is low systemic 
clarity the threats and opportunities are remote and less intense, in these situations’ unit-level 
intervening variables play a greater role. The reverse is true when there is high systemic 
clarity and the threats and opportunities are clear and imminent, that means that the policy 
choices of states are constrained, and domestic factor are not as important (Baun & Marek, 
2019). Russian use of hybrid instruments such as hacking and trying to undermine elections in 
France and the US is away too murky the water and blur the systemic clarity.     
Uncertainty is another factor that must be accounted for, since the signals sent by the 
international system is not always clear, leaders can face uncertainty in their calculation of the 
balance-of-power or what intentions other states have. Other factors that impact uncertainty is 
unit-level factors like leaders’ worldview or strategic culture (Ripsman et al, 2016:51). 
Germany has a long and troubled relationship with Russia. Angela Merkle who was born and 
raised in the German Democratic Republic, she travelled in the Soviet Union, she speaks the 
language. Merkle’s decision making skills is said to come from her natural science 
background.  
Mushaben (2017:134) writes that before Merkel reacts to a crisis or any important event: 
She attempts to discern the main actors, their motives, and interests before 




solutions. Next, she considers the best level for addressing the problem, the most 
trustworthy actors, and a promising decision-making structure [] ... She will not 
commit to a decision until she has a sense of both the short- and long-term effects 
associated with potential solutions. 
Even with such a thorough methodology for decision making as Merkle’s, German strategic 
culture can bring back uncertainty on how to react to Russian belligerence. The German 
defence white paper (2016) highlights Russian troublemaking:  
In the course of extensively modernising its armed forces, Russia appears to be 
prepared to test the limits of existing international agreements. By increasingly 
using hybrid instruments to purposefully blur the borders between war and peace, 
Russia is creating uncertainty about the nature of its intentions. (p.32) 
Russia has increased their military spending by 175 percent since 2000 to 2019 according to 
SIPRI, but some researcher argues that the number is much higher than that. By using 
purchasing power parity (PPP) rather than market exchange rates the rate of military spending 
in Russia was between a range of 150$ billion to 180$ billion the last five years (Kofman & 
Connolly, 2019). This massive increase in expenditure has given Russia the ability to fully 
modernize its ICMB arsenal that will 100% complete in 2024, and the means to 
operationalize it Avangard hypersonic boost glide vehicle and to deploy 20 regiments of its 
new Sarmat heavy ICBM by 2027 (Schneider, 2020, 23april).    
In the realm of arms control there have are reasons to be concerned in the EU, the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty expired august 2, 2019. The only remaining 
arms control agreement left is the new START which is set to expire in 2021 if it is not 
extended (Kimball, 2020). All these are bilateral deals between Russia and USA affects 
Europe, but Europe has no say in it. That the US left the INF treaty without consultation with 
its close allies speaks loudly about the relationship between the Trump administration and the 
EU. The US said that Russia was in “material breach” of the treaty and was non-compliant 
and was forced to withdraw from the treaty (Taheran, 2019, 1 Feb). This episode shows how 
dependent the EU is on American defence support. Russia is portrayed as a geopolitical 
challenge for the EU, one that does not hesitate to use military power to redraw the boarder of 
a European country, something that is a real problem for the EU since it goes against some of 




The influence of the United States of America 
The United States of America has for many years been signalling that its security 
concerns had shifted from Europe and the Middle East to East Asian and the rising 
superpower China. In 2011 the Obama administration announced it strategic rebalancing 
toward Asia, in what became known as the pivot to Asia. The pivot entailed a deeper strategic 
involvement in the Asia-pacific and a lesser military footprint in the Middle East (De Castro 
2018:180). As the US national interests in the Middle East diminishes, it is up to the 
Europeans to fill the gap. The uncertainty about the US role in European security and the 
Trump administration hostilities towards his European colleagues and when Trump speaking 
before NATO in 2017 failed to explicit endorse Article 5 about the mutual aid clause, and his 
refusal to do so has shaken his NATO allies (Gray 2017, May 25). American leaders have at 
least since 2011 when Robert Gates was President Barack Obamas secretary of defence, 
berated his European colleagues, when he told them if they don´t increase their investment in 
defence capabilities the US might not see the point in NATO. The German white paper (2016) 
sees it as an opportunity for the transatlantic partnership to grow closer and more productive 
“the more we Europeans are prepared to shoulder a larger share of the common burden, and 
the more our American partners engage in shared decision-making”.  
In Europe one of the strongest proponents of European strategic autonomy is the French 
president Emmanuel Macron, he called NATO brain dead and questioned American 
commitment to collective defence in an interview with a newspaper (BBC, 2017, November 
7).  
President Macron mentioned the relationship with the US in his Initiative for Europe speech 
in 2017, that speech is more known as the Sorbonne speech, when he said that he noticed a 
“gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States” in European security (Macron, 
2017, September 26). Macrons statements about NATO and the US is a subtle way of saying 
that the EU needs to bolster its own military resources and strive for strategic autonomy.  
Trump has also shown disdain for the EU as a whole and even called it a foe. In 2017 Jean-
Claude Juncker held a speech at the defence and security conference in Prague where he 
starkly declared  
The United States fundamentally changed its foreign policy long before the 




American partners consider that they are shouldering too much of the burden for 
their wealthy European Allies. 
This realisation led him to say, “the protection of Europe can no longer be outsourced” 
(Junker 2017). This was also something that the French defence white paper (2013) 
acknowledged:   
 
The United States are cutting back on military spending and partly refocusing 
their military efforts on the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, our US allies are 
likely to become more selective with regard to their foreign commitments. It also 
puts more pressure on the Europeans to shoulder responsibility for the security 
issues that concern them most directly. (p.9) 
The same sentiment was also echoed in the German white paper (2016): 
In past years, the United States has increasingly called on its partners, including 
in Europe, to take on more responsibility. This trend is likely to continue in view 
of economic and political developments in the United States. (p.31) 
This uncertainty about American protection of Europe has a strong influence on the discourse 
about strategic autonomy and one of the crucial reasons that the notion of European strategic 
autonomy has become such an important topic in the European capitals. The American case is 
both an opportunity and a potential problem, it is an opportunity for the EU to form a closer 
defence union. But the threat of possibly leaving NATO or not living up to the article 5 cluse 
is reason for concern.   
Brexit 
The UK was the EUs biggest defence actor, but with the pro brexit vote on June 23, 
2016, the EU lost one of its greatest military contributors, and with Trump being vague on if 
the US would commit to NATOs article 5 and his constant belligerent approach to his allies. 
Angela Merkel realized that the one of the most important security actors in Europe were 
gone with the brexit vote, and that the systemic pressures from the other case studies are so 
big that even German scepticism towards its military is eroding and is starting to realise that it 




The UK has a complex history to the EU, and even though Tony Blair was one of the 
architects of the CSDP and European strategic autonomy, the UK has blocked or delayed 
proposals of an EU Operational Headquarters, to the funding of the European Defence 
Agency necessary to launch EU projects and most important the UK was against ambitions 
expressions of the CSDP (Howorth, 2017).  
 So, when Brexit happened it gave the other EU countries the possibility to increase their 
security and defence cooperation, that shows that the EU is committed to strengthening the 
CSDP and deeper integration overall. This shows that the EU is serious in its attempts at an 
ever-closer defence union, that the UK was relucted to. And on 8 June 2017 the EU 
established the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as a permanent operational 
headquarters something that the UK was against. 
The brexit vote was both a shock and an opportunity for the EU. Shortly after the brexit vote 
in 2016, the EU launched PESCO to raise cooperation among the member states by 
committing to invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities, something that the UK 
was sceptical about and that could show that the EU is committed to cooperation and greater 
security and defence integration. Without brexit it is difficult to see how the EU would be 
able to pursue strategic autonomy in security and defence, when they where so sceptical about 
it.     
One thing that structural realism has trouble with is to take in consideration leaders’ ability 
and willingness to change policy. According to structural realism Germany should have 
started balancing long ago as the balance-of-power in the region has been shifting for a time. 
But it took until 2017 to hear Angela Merkel say during an election speech in 2017,  
The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, 
over[…] I’ve experienced that in the last few days. We Europeans truly have to 
take our fate into our own hands… We have to know that we must fight for our 
future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans (BBC, 2017).  
This was in response to Trump lambasting Europe and the brexit vote, this shows how big of 
impact the brexit vote and the Trump administration has had on German strategic thinking. 
These events have resulted in that the leader image of Angela Merkle as a methodical, 




system it must have the not only economic muscles but also military muscles and the ability 
for the EU to act autonomously. Overall brexit was an opportunity for the EU to take 
meaningful steps towards a deeper security and defence union that the UK had blocked.    
The rise of China 
The last case is the rise of China, it is the most profound geopolitical challenge of the 
EU. Not only is China the EUs second biggest trading partner, but China has also invested in 
strategic assets in the EU, like the port of Piraeus in Greece and investing significantly in 
engineering companies in Germany. China is also trying to influence international economic 
governance through the creation of Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) and The Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI), the massive China led infrastructure project is Xi Jinpings effort to 
realize the chines experience of emphasizing infrastructure development to promote growth 
and regional cooperation (Huang, 2016).     
The rise of China is the most fundamental change in the international system, China will 
become a peer competition to USA. Chinas rise has been successful because it started as the 
factory of the world, its economic transformation from the late eighties forward has made the 
Chinese’s economy bigger than the USA if calculated in purchasing power parity (PPP). For a 
long time, there has been a belief in the west that the more economic successes and openness 
that China has the faster it will transform into more of a western liberal state, it took until the 
19th party congress in 2017 for the elites in the west to realize that China is not changing into 
a liberal western country, it rather seems to become more authoritarian when “Xi Jinpings 
thoughts” became enshrined in the China constitution.    
When Xi Jinping became the chairman of the Chines communist party in 2012, he discarded 
Deng Xiaoping’s dictate “hide your capabilities and bide your time,” and launched his vision 
of the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation, which aims to make China a great power 
again. In Xi Jinpings speech during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China he outlined The Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, in 
where a modernization of the military is an important part, to turn the PLA into a world class 
fighting force that can fight and win (Xi Jinping 2018:16). China has put in a lot of effort to 
the modernization of the Chinese military. The Chines military expenditure has risen from 




Research Institute (SIPRI, 2019), that makes it the second highest spender, behind the USA. 
China has claimed a string of island in the South China Sea and even built some man-made 
islands in the contested seas. The Paracel and spratley islands has airstrips and military 
installations, and Woody Island hosts cruise missiles a radar system and can deploy fighter 
jets (CFR, 2020). The EUs strategic outlook paper on China, notes that Chinas military 
capabilities is a security issue for the EU:  
China's increasing military capabilities coupled with its comprehensive vision and 
ambition to have the technologically most advanced armed forces by 2050 present 
security issues for the EU, already in a short to mid-term perspective (p.4) 
This shift in the balance-of-power is a once in a century occurrence, and it is reverberating 
through out the international system. China with its 1.5 billion people and massive state 
sanctioned strive to become a technological superpower with its “Made in 2025” policy 
(Cyrill, 2018). The program aims to make China leading in ten high technology sectors, such 
as AI, robotics, electrical vehicles, and the end goal of “Made in 2025” is to make the 
domestic company self-sufficient. This is a threat to the EU companies that compete in the 
same segment, like the German “mittelstand” companies that the Chinese have been buying 
up in the recent years. This complicated relationship with China has led the EU to 
simultaneously described its relationship with China on three separate levels – partner, 
competitor, and rival (European Commission, HR/VP, 2019).  
This new more realist view of China has also appeared in “EU – China A strategic outlook” 
document that was released in 2019, where they call China a systemic rival promoting 
alternative models of government (EEAS, 2019: 1).  
Josep Borrell who is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission means that European strategic autonomy 
is a process of political survival. He means that the world has change and that the weight of 
Europe has are diminishing, Europe have gone from 25% of the world GNP thirty years ago 
to a predicted 11% in another twenty years, Chinese GNP will be around 22% and US at 14% 
(Borrell 2020, December 3). Basically, he says that the rise of China will affect the 
international system in such a way that the European Union must be militarily prepared to 




The EU and the US will see a relative decline in the share of GNP, as other countries get 
richer, in what Fareed Zakaria calls the rise of the rest. The German defence white paper 
(2016:30) also mentioned how the economic, political, and military growth of key states in 
the international system will lead to increasing multipolarity and a diffusion of power. They 
note that “China could account for one fifth of the global economic output by 2030”, and in 
defence “China already spends approximately as much as all EU states combined.”   
China is a curious case because it represents both an economic opportunity for European 
companies and a potential rival in global governance and maybe even a military threat.  
Pew research shows how the attitude towards China has become more negative in recent years 
and it has accelerated during this year, it is the Chinese mishandling of the Covid-19 epidemic 
that started in Wuhan, that has resulted in a massive distrust towards the Chinese leadership. 
The percent of the population with an unfavourable view if China has increased by 15% from 
2019 to 2020 in Germany, now 71% of the population views China unfavourably (Pew 
research 2020). That the public attitude towards China is so negative makes it easier for the 
political leaders to get support for harsh policy against China. Right now, the threat the comes 
from China is economic and technological not military as of yet. But the potential of a 
military powerful China with its vast resources is pressuring policy makers in the EU to 















The research question that this thesis sought to answer was: What factors are behind EUs 
sudden strive for strategic autonomy and how can it best be theoretically explained?  
We have demonstrated the strength of combining the different unit-levels in an integrated 
theoretical framework and how it reveals a broader landscape of analysis which helps us 
better understand theoretically why there is so much focus on the notion of strategic 
autonomy. The rise of China is the most significant geopolitical change since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and because of the sheer size of the country and its population it will assert its 
right to political and economic influence in the international system. Right now, China is 
more of an economic threat to the EU, but the potential military power that China will have in 
the future is an aspect that the leaders of the EU cannot disregard.    
This thesis has shown how the shift in the international system from a unipolar world to a 
multipolar world where the factors behind the systemic pressures of Russian aggressiveness 
and the rise of China and together with a more uncertain transatlantic alliance, has led to 
domestic pressure for more cooperation in CSDP and not from dynamics internal to the EU or 
from social processes as explained by liberal and constructivist theories. Brexit has also 
encouraged, and incentivised members states to increase activity in CSDP as a way to 
ameliorate the loss of the UK but also as a way to increase the integration of the union in 
“high politic” areas. All these systemic shifts have forced the EU to realize that if it wants to 
remain an international player it must become more than a normative power, it must also 
become a military power, with the strategic autonomy to pursue its own interests.   
In June 2020, the EU defence ministers launched “strategic compass”, which will lay out a 
new strategy concerning the EUs aims in security and defence policy. It will also try to build 
a common European security culture, so that everybody agrees on the key threats facing 
Europe and how to best counter these threats (Scazzieri 2020). In this thesis we argued that 
the strategic culture of Germany and France as the intervening variables is the most likely 
variable to influence their respective national defence cooperation.  
Assuming that the strategic compass succeeds in providing a strategic culture for all the EU, 




factors like institutional structures and public opinion can increase in influence as the 




























Anderson, S. Seitz, R, T. (2006) European Security and Defense Policy Demystified Nation-
Building and Identity in the European Union. Armed forces and Society. Volume, 33. 
Number 1. 24-42  
APnews (2020) Putin: Russia-China military alliance can’t be ruled out. Retrieved from: 
https://apnews.com/article/beijing-moscow-foreign-policy-russia-vladimir-putin-
1d4b112d2fe8cb66192c5225f4d614c4 
Art, J, R. Brooks, G, S. Wohlforth, C, W. Lieber, A, K. Alexander, G. (2006) 
Correspondence: Striking the Balance. International Security, Volume 30, Number 3, Winter 
2005/06, pp. 177-196 
Baun, M & Marek, D. (2019) Making Europe Defend Again: The Relaunch of European 
Defense Cooperation from a Neoclassical Realist Perspective. Czech journal of international 
realations. Vol. 54. Nr. 4 DOI: https://doi.org/10.32422/mv.1643  
BBC (2017) Merkel: Europe 'can no longer rely on allies' after Trump and Brexit. Retrieved 
from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40078183  
BBC (2019, November 7) Nato alliance experiencing brain death, says Macron. Retrieved 
from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50335257  
Borrell, J. (2020, December 3) Why European strategic autonomy matters. Retrieved from: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/89865/Why%20European%20strategic%20autonomy%20matters 
Chaillot paper 47 (2001) From St-Malo to Nice European defence: Core documents. 
Retrieved from: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/st-malo-nice-european-defence-core-
documents 
Council of the European Union (2017) Council conclusions on progress in implementing the 
EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence. Retrieved from: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/06/conclusions-security-
defence/ 
Council of Foreign Relations. (2020) Global Conflict Tracker: Territorial disputes in the 





CVCE (2020) The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC). Retrivied from: 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/1c8aa583-8ec5-41c4-9ad8-
73674ea7f4a7/bd191c42-0f53-4ec0-a60a-c53c72c747c2 
Cyrill, M. (2018, 28 dec) What is Made in China 2025 and Why Has it Made the World So 
Nervous?. China-briefing. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/made-in-china-2025-
explained/ 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. (2020) Factsheet: Results of first CARD. Retrieved 
from: https://eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-details/pub/factsheet-results-of-
first-card 
Dunne, T. & Schmidt, C, B. (2017) Realism. In Baylis, J. Smith, S. & Owens, P. Ed. The 
globalization of world politics. An introduction to International Relations. Oxford university 
press. Oxford  
Dyson, T (2013) Balancing Threat, not Capabilities: European Defence Cooperation as 
Reformed Bandwagoning, Contemporary Security Policy, 34:2, 387-391, DOI: 
10.1080/13523260.2013.808073 
Denscombe, M. (2008) Communities of Practice A Research Paradigm for the Mixed 
Methods Approach. Journal of mixed methods research. Vol. 2. Nr. 3 270-283  
De Castro, R.C. (2018), The Obama Administration's Strategic Rebalancing to Asia: Quo 
Vadis in 2017?. Pacific Focus, 33: https://doi-org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/10.1111/pafo.12115 
Esaiasson, P., Gilljam, M., Oscarsson, H., Towns, A.E. & Wängnerud, L. (2017). 
Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. (Femte upplagan). 
Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. 
European Union external action service. (2020) Shaping of a Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Retrieved from: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-
csdp/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en 
European defence agency (2020) Our current priorities. Retrived from: 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities 






European Commission, HR/VP. (2019) EU-China A strategic outlook. Retrieved from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-
outlook.pdf   
European Commission (2019) Public opinion. Retrieved from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/line
Chart/themeKy/29/groupKy/181/savFile/195 
Federal Government. (2016) On German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr. 
[white paper]. German federal ministry of defence. Retrieved from: 
https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Other-Documents/The-2016-German-White-
Paper-Strategic-Review-and-Way-Ahead 
Fiott, D. (2018) Strategic autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?. Brief issue.  
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 
Fiott, D. (2020) Introduction. In Fiott, D Ed. The CSDP in 2020, The EUs legacy and 
ambition in security and defence. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)  
Flockhart, T. (2016) Realism and foreign policy. In Smith, S. Hadfield, A. Dunne, T. Ed. 
Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford university press. Oxford.   
Gray, R. (2017) Trump Declines to Affirm NATO's Article 5. The Atlantic. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-declines-to-affirm-natos-
article-5/528129/ 
Hellman, M. (2016) Assuming Great Power Responsibility: French Strategic Culture and 
International Military Operations. In Britz, M. (Eds). European Participation in International 
Operations: The Role of Strategic Culture. Palgrave Macmillan  
Howorth, J. (2017). EU Defence Cooperation after Brexit: What Role for the UK in the 
Future EU Defence Arrangements? European View, 16(2), 191–
200. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0455-5 
Huang, Y. (2016) Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework and 
assessment. China economic review. Volume 40. September 2016, Pages 314-321   
Hurmerinta-Peltomäki, L., Nummela, N. (2006) Mixed methods in international business 
research: A value-added perspective. Management International Review. 46, 439–459. 
https://doi-org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/10.1007/s11575-006-0100-z 
Hyde-Price, A. (2004) European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force, European 




Hyde-Price, A. (2011) Neorealism:A Structural Approach to CSDP. In Kurowska, X. Breuer, 
F, Ed. Explaining the EU´s Common security and defence policy. Palgrave. London  
Isachenkov, V. (2020, 22 October) Putin: Russia-China military alliance can’t be ruled out. 
Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/beijing-moscow-foreign-policy-russia-vladimir-
putin-1d4b112d2fe8cb66192c5225f4d614c4    
Junker, JC. (2017) Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defence and Security 
Conference Prague: In defence of Europe. Retrieved from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_17_1581  
Kaufman, M. Connolly, R. (2019) Why Russian military spending is much higher than 
commonly understood (as is china´s). Retrieved from: 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/why-russian-military-expenditure-is-much-higher-than-
commonly-understood-as-is-chinas/ 
Kimball, D. (2020) U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance. Arms 
control association. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements   




Maull, H, W. (2000) Germany and the use of force: Still a `Civilian Power`? Survival, vol. 42, 
no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 56–80 
Meyer, O, C. (2011) The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from 
Strategic Culture Research for the European Union's Evolution as a Military Power. 
International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 55. No. 3.   
Mushaben, J. (2017). Checkmate: Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin, and the Dilemmas of 
Regional Hegemony. In Becoming Madam Chancellor: Angela Merkel and the Berlin 
Republic (pp. 123-160). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
New York Times. (2007) Gates urges Europe to increase NATO spending. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/europe/11iht-afghan.4550526.html 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2020a) Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-





North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2020b) Funding NATO. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm  
Pohl, B. (2013a) Neither Bandwagoning nor Balancing: Explaining Europe's Security Policy. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 34:2, 353-373, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2013.805932 
Pohl, B. (2013b) The logic underpinning EU crisis management operations. European 
Security, 22:3, 307-325, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2012.726220 
Posen, B, R. (2006) European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?. 
Security Studies, 15:2, 149-186, DOI: 10.1080/09636410600829356 
Posen, B. (2020) Europe can defend itself. Survival, 62:6, 7-34, DOI: 
10.1080/00396338.2020.1851080 
Pew research (2020) Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries.  
Retrieved from: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-
reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/ 
Richter, F. (2016) The emergence and evolution of CSDP: A liberal approach. In Cladi, L. & 
Locatelli, A. Eds. International Relations theory and European security: we thought we knew. 
Routledge.    
Ripsman, M, Norrin. (2011) Neoclassical Realism. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.36 
Schweller, L, R. (2004) Unanswered Threats: A neoclassical realist theory of underbalancing. 
International Security. Volume 29, Number 2, Fall 2004 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2019). SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database. Retrieved from: 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%
E2%80%932019%20in%20constant%20%282018%29%20USD.pdf 
Schneider, M, B. (2020) Russian Modernization of Its ICBM Force. Real Clear Defence. 
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/23/russian_modernization_of_its_icbm_fo
rce_115224.html  
Taheran, S. (2019, 1 Feb) Selected reactions to the INF treaty crisis. Arms control 
association. https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018/select-reactions-inf-treaty-crisis 
Wohlforth, C. W. (2016) Realism and foreign policy. In Smith, S. Hadfield, A. Dunne, T. Ed. 




Xi Jinping (2017) Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in 
All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a 
New Era. Retrieved from: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_C
ongress.pdf  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
